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Preferences erosion and trade costs in the sugar market: the impact of the 





Preferential trade agreements are thought of as an important instrument for integrating the 
developing (DCs) and least developed countries (LDCs) into the world trading system. The 
Everything But Arms initiative (EBA) of the European Union (EU) and the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act of the United States (US) consist of trade agreements that aim at 
increasing trade flows between developed countries and LDCs in order to stimulate growth.
1 
On average, the initial impact of EBA on LDCs total exports to the EU is small, whilst the 
limited export success is not uniform across countries due to a number of reasons. Firstly, 
rules that govern trade under the EBA, such as those on transport and the definition of the 
origin of the products, are thought to result in under-utilisation of preferences due to 
increasing trade costs (Brenton, 2003). Secondly, EBA has extended duty free access to a 
small number of agricultural products, whilst access for the majority of products was 
complete under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and the Cotonou Agreement. In 
addition, a number of LDCs are unable to take advantage of EBA due to the current 
composition of their exports, as products that are traditionally exported to the EU markets 
have been receiving duty-free access under other agreements.  
A number of studies focused on the potential impact of EBA on both the EU, and the 
beneficiary countries’ sugar sectors. Among these, UNCTAD (2005) indicates that potential 
increases in sugar exports to the EU under the initiative are likely to be limited, due to the 
constraints arising from natural resource endowments and transport infrastructures, which are 
analysed in country case studies. Similarly, Stevens and Kennan (2001) suggest that total 
LDCs’ sugar exports may reach some 300 to 500 thousand tonnes on top of the EBA quota. 
van Berkum et al (2005) suggest that these may reach 450 thousand tonnes. An opposite view 
is expressed, instead, by Witzke and Kuhn (2003), who calculate that LDCs’ sugar exports to 
the EU market may reach 2 million tonnes in 2011.  
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001of 28 February 2001 provide details on the Everything But Arms 
initiative. For a comprehensive description of the initiative see UNCTAD (2005).   2
Although informative, studies on the impact of the EBA initiative do not adequately cover 
important issues that relate to international trade and the trade costs countries face. Firstly, 
relative productivities and differences in technology concur in determining trade flows. 
Secondly, trade diminishes with distance, whilst infrastructure determines trade costs. 
Moreover, it is not only the natural trade barriers that determine trade costs and flows: import 
tariffs in the EU increase the cost of trade nearly twofold. Due to trade costs, few LDCs that 
are not subject to the Cotonou agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries (ACP) export sugar to the EU. Exports from Sudan, Mozambique and 
Ethiopia to the EU in 2003 amounted to about 42 thousand tonnes, whilst those originating 
from Burkina Faso, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritania, Somalia, Niger 
and Sierra Leone amounted to 14 thousand tonnes. Apart from these countries, other LDCs do 
not export sugar to the EU.  
In assessing trade costs, Anderson and Wincoop (2003, 2004) distinguish between border and 
non-border barriers. The former refer to barriers that involve rents such as tariffs and quotas, 
whilst the latter relate to natural trade barriers such as distance, infrastructure transport and 
communication technologies. Natural trade costs, therefore, include freight costs, information 
costs, contract enforcement costs, costs related to the use of different currencies, inventory 
costs, and regulatory costs that may be prohibitive for LDCs. 
The present study takes into consideration trade costs that arise from both tariff and natural 
trade barriers in the context of EBA initiative, in order to assess the perspective volume of 
LDC-sugar exports to the EU, and the extent to which the EU policy reform may affect the 
LDCs as well as the ACP countries’ exports that currently take place under the Cotonou 
agreement. 
A baseline stretching to 2013 is simulated, incorporating the effect of the EBA initiative and 
its impact on the LDC and ACP countries, plus a policy scenario including the 39 percent 
reduction in the domestic support price of the EU, which translates in a reduction of the prices 
paid for export from LDCs and ACPs in the EU.  
 
2. Model Framework   3
We utilise the non-spatial partial equilibrium COSIMO-AGLINK
2 recursive dynamic model 
of the world sugar market, in combination with a gravity model which is used to quantify the 
maximum potential export flows from LDCs to the EU under the EBA initiative. COSIMO-
AGLINK contains 782 equations and identities and covers a total of 56 countries and regions
3, 
allowing two types of traded sugars, refined and raw sugar, and two sugar inputs, cane and 
beet
4. The model is calibrated on the year 2003 and is utilised to generate a set of solutions up 
to 2013. World and domestic prices are determined endogenously by clearing the world 
market, as well as domestic markets of countries, such as the EU 25, Mexico, the United 
States and China, which are insulated in terms of world market price effects  
In the ACP countries, the marginal economic incentive is calculated as a weighted pool - or 
blend price - of the price received for sugar exported under the Sugar Protocol (SP) and the 
Special Preferential Sugar (SPS), the price received for exports within the US tariff rate quota 
(TRQ), and of the world price for production exported to the world market. Thus, ACP 
countries are modelled as price-takers, with imperfect transmission of world price signals. For 
those ACP countries which are also classified as LDCs, where the EBA initiative implies a 
TRQ that increases by 15 percent per year between 2002 and 2008 and duty free unlimited 
access after year 2009, the price determination described above is applied until 2008 on the 
basis of the corresponding EBA TRQ. From 2009 onwards, it is assumed that ACPs and 
LDCs will be capable of exporting exclusively to the EU, thus being exposed to the EU 
reference price. 
The gravity model is employed to determine the maximum amount of exports of the 
individual LDCs to the EU, on the basis of tariff and natural trade barriers. This is estimated 
on panel data for food and tobacco exports to the EU from 47 LDCs during the period 1988-
2004, allowing the estimation of dynamic equations and the investigation of the adjustment 
                                                 
2   The COSIMO-AGLINK model was developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Details of the AGLINK model are 
available in OECD (2004). COSIMO-AGLINK is an extension of the AGLINK model conducted by the FAO, 
covering, in addition to OECD Member States and main developing producing countries, 22 ACP countries and 
LDCs. 
3 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, 
Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, EU 6 (including Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Cote d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, 
Netherlands, other LDCs, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, USA, Vietnam, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, and Rest of the World.  
4 In some major producing regions, such as Brazil and the USA, the model also includes sweetener substitutes on 
the demand side, ethanol and the joint product aspect of sugar and molasses.    4
process. Adjustment to a new trade relationship with the EU, characterised by no tariff 
barriers after 2009 may be gradual and not instantaneous for LDCs that, without doubt, face 
significant adjustment costs not only in increasing production to take advantage of the 
preferences, but also in administering exports under the EBA initiative.  
Data on the value of food and tobacco exports to the EU and the relevant weighted tariff 
levels is collected from COMTRADE. We use food and tobacco exports instead of sugar 
exports because the latter are limited, and because the EBA initiative involves imports of all 
products. Data on infrastructure is collected from the World Development Indicators provided 
by the World Bank. Transport costs are collected in the form of the proportion of the value of 
exports that is dissipated in transportation.  
The empirical gravity model is as follows: 
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where xej, yi and ye denote exports from country i to the EU in year t and the GDP of the 
exporting country and the EU respectively in the same year. The variable tarie,t denotes the 
level of the ad valorem tariff faced by the exporting country in time t, whilst the k variables zij 
refer to several variables relating to natural tariff barriers. εie,t is a standard error term, whilst 
ηie is an unobserved country-specific and time-invariant effect that can be thought of as an 
additional determinant of exports on the basis of characteristics that are idiosyncratic to each 
country. The lagged dependent variable and the lagged tariff terms capture the adjustment 
process to the new environment. 
We estimate the gravity equation using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), a 
standard procedure for dynamic panel data models. GMM, as developed by Hansen (1982) 
and extended for first-differenced dynamic panels by Arellano and Bond (1991), consists of 
an asymptotically efficient estimator in this context.
 5  
                                                 
5 Details on GMM and its application on panel data are in Arellano and Bond (1991). Surveys on GMM are 
provided by Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000) and Arellano and Honore (2001). An intuitive review is 
provided by Bond (2002). The method is robust to correlated country specific effects and endogeneity. It is a 
standard procedure for dynamic panel data models to transform the variables to their first differences in order to 
eliminate the country specific effects ηie from the model. This transformation introduces correlation between the 
differenced lagged dependent variable and the differenced error term, rendering the OLS estimator inconsistent.   5
 
3. Results 
The parameters of the gravity equation are presented in Table 1. We experimented with 
different natural barrier variables, such as the length of paved roads, the number of telephone 
lines per thousand inhabitants and other, but parameter estimates were not significant for all 
variables, due to the lack of variation of the series. The final specification is parsimonious. In 
addition to the GDP ratio, included lagged tariff terms and a transport cost variable.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 1: Dynamic gravity equation estimates 
Estimates highlight the importance of tariff barriers in determining trade flows in the medium 
run. Reductions in the tariff level are expected to increase significantly the flow of exports 
from the LDCs to the EU; a 10 per cent reduction in the tariff level will result in a 20 percent 
increase of exports to the EU in the long run. The estimated parameter for transport costs also 
confirms the importance of well functioning and efficient infrastructure. 
We calibrate the model to sugar exports to the EU for year 2003 for the LDCs that have 
exported to the EU during the period 1988-2004.
6  These are subject to tariffs that are 
determined by the EBA in-quota and out-of-the-quota tariffs, the corresponding GDPs, and 
transport costs. 
The baseline generated with the COSIMO-AGLINK model shows an increase in the world 
reference price, following the application of the EBA initiative, together with a reduction in 
the EU domestic production and an increase in imports from the LDCs. The reform of the EU 
sugar regime results in an average 5 percent increase in the world prices for both raw and 
white sugar (Figure 1), and its impact on the rest of the world is relatively limited.  
INSERT ABOUT HERE Figure 1 
                                                                                                                                                          
Instrumental variables estimators, such as 2SLS are consistent but not asymptotically efficient due to 
identification problems. In the context of dynamic panel data models, under the assumption that the error term 
εie,t is not serially correlated, GMM estimators are asymptotically efficient. In this paper, we adhere to the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM estimator, correcting for heteroscedasticity in a manner similar to the 
White period covariance estimation. We utilise the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions to test the validity 
of the identifying assumption that there is no serial correlation in the residuals. 
6 Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Sierra Leone.   6
Figure 1: World price of sugar (US$ per tonne, raw) 
Brazil is projected to export about 26 million tonnes in 2013, whilst the simulation of the EU 
reform suggests that Brazil will export an additional amount of about one million tonnes in 
that year. India’s net trade position, which projects the country importing about 4 million 
tonnes in 2013, is only slightly improved by the EU domestic reform. Thailand is projected to 
export about 400 thousand tonnes more in the reform scenario, reaching 7.8 million tonnes in 
2013. 
The baseline suggests a reduction in the EU output due to EBA initiative imports. Total sugar 
imports in the EU are simulated to further increase following the domestic policy reform, 
albeit by a lower rate than that indicated by the baseline, particularly after 2009 (see Figure 2). 
In general, under both the baseline and the reform scenario, the EBA initiative results in an 
increase in imports by almost 700 thousand tonnes in three years. Towards the end of the 
simulation horizon, the effect of the EU reform causes imports under the EBA to slow down 
due to the reduction in the price paid to ACP countries under the Sugar Protocol, and the price 
imports that originate in LDCs receive under the EBA initiative. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2: Sugar imports in the EU 25 (,000 tonnes) 
The EU reform affects the preferential trade partners: trade is diverted away from countries 
which currently enjoy preferential access to the EU market, such as the higher cost ACP 
producing countries that export within the Sugar Protocol. These would be displaced by more 
efficient LDCs, some of which are also ACPs and enjoy duty-free unlimited-quota access to 
the EU market within the EBA initiative. In the simulation, the ability of these countries to 
export to the EU market is constrained by transport costs represented by the gravity equation.  
Three country groups can be identified among those enjoying preferential access to the EU 
market. Firstly, ACP developing countries, which currently enjoy preferential access under 
the SP and the SPS are expected to be affected by both the abolition of the SPS, as well as by 
the reduction in the EU price. The latter will have a significant impact on high cost producers, 
such as Barbados, where both total exports and exports to the EU are falling dramatically (see 
Table 3), whilst the elimination of SPS will affect ACP low-cost producing countries such as 
Trinidad, Swaziland, Mauritius, Jamaica, Guyana, Fiji and the Cote d’Ivoire.    7
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2: Raw sugar exports of ACP countries and LDC 
Secondly, for least developed ACP countries that export to the EU under the SP and SPS, the 
EBA initiative leads to unlimited duty-free access to the EU market. Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zambia are simulated to increase their exports to the EU significantly. Trade costs are 
assumed not to pose significant barriers to exports, as these countries have been exporting to 
the EU for long period of time.  
A third group comprises those LDCs which are not SP and SPS signatories and, therefore, 
will obtain significant benefits from the EBA initiative. Some of these LDCs are important 
sugar producers, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan. Exports from Ethiopia to the EU 
(see Figure 3) are simulated to reach 100 thousand tonnes by 2013, whilst those from 
Mozambique increase from 10 to 60 thousand tonnes during the same period. In a like manner 
Sudan is simulated to increase its exports to the EU nearly fivefold. EU policy reform is not 
expected to alter these export trends that are predominantly determined by the EBA initiative. 
Other LDCs that are not significant sugar exporters, but have been exporting regularly small 
amounts of sugar to the EU in the recent years are Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Sierra Leone, 
that  are included in the simulation as ‘other LDCs’, and Bangladesh. For these countries, the 
baseline indicates that exports may increase due to the EBA (Table 2), to a moderate level 
mainly due to the constraints imposed by transport costs, while the reform of the EU policy 
does not imply significant changes.  
INSERT FIGURES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3: Ethiopia – Exports to the EU (,000 tonnes) 
Figure 4: Mozambique – Exports to the EU (,000 tonnes) 
In total, sugar exports of the ACP countries to the EU are projected to increase by about 7 
percent between 2001-03 and 2011-13, reaching 1.6 million tonnes; while those of the LCDs 
would increase threefold, reaching 427 thousand tonnes. Export of the ACPs toward non-EU 
destinations are projected to decrease by some 12 percent in the same period, while those of 
the LDCs would be reduced by over 40 percent.    8
Finally, the EU sugar policy reform, as proposed by the Commission, will without doubt 
worsen export revenues due to a reduction in the price received by the ACPs, while for the 
LDCs as a group export revenue would be 150 percent higher than that of the 2001-03 period 
(Table 3). ACP countries-signatories to the SP would also gain as a group, but solely due to 
countries that are calso classified as Least Developed and will export to the EU under the 
EBA initiative. Other ACP countries will experience substantial losses, such as Barbados, 
Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire. In the same vein, wide potential gains arise for some of the 
LDCs, particularly Sudan, Tanzania, and the “other LDCs”.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The results suggest that the EU sugar policy reform will imply an erosion of preferences for 
the ACP countries that export to the EU under the SP, and gains for the LDCs due to the 
implementation of the EBA initiative. In the baseline, export growth would be limited to little 
more than 500 thousand tonnes, given the combined effect of the natural trade costs and the 
price changes. In this respect, our results are consistent with the conclusions of UNCTAD 
(2005) and those of Steven and Keenan (2003), but not with the estimates provided by Witze 
and Kuhn (2003). At the same time, the reform proposed by the Commission seem to make a 
more significant difference in terms of export revenues for the LDC and for most of the ACP 
countries than in terms of exported volumes, given that its effect on the world price is too 
small to determine any significant trade creation and diversion outside the administered SP 
quotas and the EBA preferences, and given that the EU domestic price, however reduced, still 
remains far higher than the world market price.  
Further analysis would be useful to deepen the understanding of the production and export 
perspectives of individual countries, both inside the ACP group and LDCs and among the 
other major producers, in at least two main areas. Firstly, our analysis does not address the 
possibility that other LDCs, which currently are not exporting sugar to the EU, could start 
doing so on the basis of the EBA initiative. Our assumption that these countries face 
prohibitive trade costs, as they have not exported sugar to the EU to date, is rather strong. 
UNCTAD (2005) has highlighted that in some of them it would also be possible that local 
production starts to be exported, while imports are increased to cover consumption. A more 
qualitative approach, focussing on the whole value chain, may improve the understanding   9
each individual country’s potential to produce and export. Secondly, one of the limitations of 
the analysis presented is that sugar is mostly treated as an homogenous product. Despite a 
simple differentiation between raw and refined sugar is available in the COSIMO-AGLINK 
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Table 1: Dynamic gravity equation estimates* 











transport z  
        
0.3643 -0.0529  -0.0796  0.1283  -0.0859 
(0.0052) (0.0096)  (0.0068)  (0.0472)  (0.0156) 
J-Statistic 51.26       
Instrument rank  55       
Sargan test p-value 0.42       
Sample 1990-2004       
Number of observations  539       
*Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Changes in exports revenues of ACP 
            and ACP-LDC countries   100 = 2001-03
2011-13b 2011-13s
  Belize 92 56
  Trinidad and Tobago 92 57
  Swaziland 82 50
  Mauritius 95 59
  Jamaica 91 56
  Guyana 94 57
  Fiji 94 57
  Dominincan Rep n.a. n.a.
  Cote d'Ivoire 56 34
  Barbados 15 8
  Kenya 0 0
  Zimbabwe 60 36
  Mozambique*# 6959 4329
  Ethiopia*# 787 481
  Burkina Faso* 245 150
  Tanzania* 409 250
  Sudan*# 553 323
  Malawi* 370 214
  Zambia* 343 231
  Madagascar* 102 81
total ACPs 115 70
  Bangladesh ** 100 61
  other LDCs 265 162
total LDCs 452 277
* ACP sugar exporters classified also as LDCs;  #=EBA only
** 100 = 2011-13b
2011-13b = baseline
2011-13s = reform  
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Figure 4. Mozambique exports to the Eu  (000 tons)
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